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East Timor-- 
The Modest
Revolution
D. Freney
"The most backward backwater in the 
w orld ” was how the Austra lian press recently 
described East (“ Portuguese") T im or. Looked 
at e c o n o m ic a lly  and h is to r ic a lly ,  th is  
undoubtedly is true. Yet in a short 16 months, 
East T im o r has se t an u n p re ce d e n te d  
example.
It is an historical paradox that East T im or, 
unknown to the w orld, closed o ff in a 
stagnating fascist-co lon ia lism  fo r 450 years, 
w ithou t overt po litica l activ ity  until April 27, 
1974, should be able to defy the geo-po litica l 
realities of its surroundings and reach a level 
of po litica l m aturity that has taken sim ilar 
movements in A frica or Asia decades to 
achieve. This unique experience is as part of 
the to ta lity  of the w orld -w ide  colonial 
revolution, which alone expla ins the politica l 
phenomenon we are now w itnessing 400 miles 
north of Darwin.
Javanese and Chinese traders made the firs t 
known contact w ith T im o rfrom  about 1000 AD
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onwards to barter goods fo r sandalwood, a 
sem i-parasitic h igh ly perfumed white wood 
tree in great demand in the region and 
particu la rly  China. T im or was lite ra lly covered 
w ith the precious wood. It was thus one of the 
“spice islands” , a ttracting the Portuguese, 
who established a trading station in M olluca in 
1511. This Portuguese influence spread by 
1566 to islands near Timor.
The Dutch drove the Portuguese out of what 
is now Indonesia, and in 1653 from  Kupang, 
now capital of Indonesian (West) Tim or. But 
they clung on east T im or, which was 
administered by the Church and Portuguese 
traders until 1702. S ign ifican tly , Portuguese 
contro l was strengthened by the emergence of 
the "Topasses” or Black Portuguese, the 
o ffspring o f Portuguese, o ther European 
Goanese and Chinese trader-adventurers, 
local and other women from  neighboring 
islands, who together form ed a skilled, literate 
free-booting pirate class rem iniscent of the 
Caribbean.
" Q u a r r e l l in g  a m o n g  th e m s e lv e s , 
m anipulating the trad itiona l chiefs in b loody 
little  trade wars aimed at con tro lling  the rich 
sandalwood industry, rebelling im partia lly 
a g a in s t bo th  C h u rc h  and S ta te , th e y  
nevertheless, in the final issue invariably 
chose Portugal, the d is tan t o rig in  of the ir 
synthetic culture, in preference to H olland.” 
( 1 )
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It was on ly in 1769 that Portugal moved the 
capita l to D ili from  the enclave o f Oe-Cussi, 
fe a r in g  D u tc h  a t ta c k .  N e v e r th e le s s ,  
th roughou t the eighteenth century, the 
Portuguese rule was nom inal, w ith feuds 
between the Church and State and the Goa 
authorities who were nom ina lly  in charge. 
Britain took contro l b rie fly in 1816 during  the 
N apoleonic Wars. All m issionaries were 
expelled by the Portuguese from  1834 to  1877, 
reflecting the continu ing  strugg le  between 
C hurch and State in Portugal itself. In 1893 a 
tenuous border agreement was drawn up w ith 
Holland.
It was only in the latter half of the nineteenth 
century that the Portuguese began to slowly 
push the ir au thority  inland, in the hope of 
d igg ing  copper, gold, precious stones and oil. 
The firs t and v irtua lly  on ly export c rop  - high 
grade Arabica (coffee) - was planted in the 
h ills  above Dili in th e  1850’s. Good results from  
wheat and cattle were not continued, through 
governm ent neglect.
Portuguese co lon isation proceeded slow ly 
and ine ffic ien tly  by Dutch standards. In the 
Dutch East Indies (and west T im or) the role of 
the trad itiona l village chiefs, the radjas, had 
been con tinua lly  eroded as part o f Dutch 
co lon ia l policy. Villages were regrouped and 
the  radjas power p o w e r l im ite d . The 
Portuguese, however, in the slow  push inland, 
w ith poor roads washed away every wet 
season, deliberate ly enhanced the powers of 
these chiefs (regulos or luirais). They were 
given many privileges and allowed to  maintain 
the ir private armies in some cases. The 
Portuguese maintained the loya lty  of the 
lu irais by d iv id e -a n d - ru le , m a in ta in in g  
trad itiona l triba l anim osities, leading to  almost 
fanatica l loya lty to  the Portuguese by some. 
The Portuguese flag was even incorpora ted  in 
an im ist rites in some areas, as a sacred object.
But in o ther areas it led to vio len t revolts, the 
m o s t fa m o u s  be ing  th a t led by Dom 
Bonaventura, in the Same region, in 1912, 
which shook Portuguese rule. B.J. Callinan, 
com m ander of Australian com m andos in East 
T im or in W orld War 11, in his book on his 
experiences, w rote of how an anti-Portuguese 
revolt in the Maubisse area, was put down by 
the expedient of the Portuguese arm ing a rival 
triba l group, w hich massacred hundreds of the 
rebels.(2)
A t the end of the Nineteenth C entury, T im or
became a separate Portuguese province. The 
sandalwood had by then been com plete ly 
stripped from T im or. The co lony stagnated, 
serving as a place of exile fo r politica l 
opponents in Portugal. These deportados 
were however often entrusted w ith the 
adm inistration of the colony.
It was W orld War 11 tha t turned East T im or 
upside down. Portugal was neutral, but the 
Japanese landed and fo r 13 months 400 
Australian com m andos pinned down 21,000 
Japanese troops, in flic tin g  1500 deaths fo rth e  
loss of 40. The Portuguese d ivided between 
those who worked w ith  the Austra lians (m ainly 
the deportados) and those who collaborated 
with the Japanese.
The Japanese, dem agogica lly, but w ith 
some effect, rallied a sector of the Timorese to 
oppose both the Austra lians and Portuguese 
through anti-white, an ti-co lon ia l propaganda. 
As in Indonesia, many T im orese were 
awakened to an ti-w h ite  and anti-co lon ia l 
sentiments by th is Japanese demagogy, 
although a m ajority remained pro-Austra lian. 
But as elsewhere in Asia, the Tim orese soon 
fe lt the hard hand of Japanese fascism. 
M assacres o f p ro -A u s tra lia n  T im o re se  
occurred, while the ruthless seizure of food 
resulted in a fam ine w h ich  took up to 40,000 
lives. T im or’s few towns were savagely 
bombed by the Austra lian air force, reducing 
them to rubble.
• The pro-Japanese elements were w iped out 
when the Portuguese returned to  fu ll contro l in 
1945. But the m em ory of Japanese an ti­
co lon ia lis t dem agogy remained. jjThere is 
evidence to link the pro-Japanese elements of 
the war period w ith the few pro-Indonesian 
forces in the island today. Some of the ir main 
leaders lived fo r some tim e in Indonesia, after 
independence, in liaison w ith s im ila r forces 
who had worked w ith the Japanese against the 
Dutch. Indeed, the “ k ill all w h ites” propaganda 
by APODETI in recent weeks over Radio 
Kupang, returns to such orig ins, w hile also 
reflecting the provocation the Indonesians 
were try ing to mount, to excuse invasion.
In 1959, Indonesian o fficers who had staged 
a revolt in the South M olluccas sought refuge 
in Portuguese T im or after the ir revolt was 
crushed. They then organised a revolt in the 
Viqueque region, w ith the aid of some 
elements who had supported the Japanese in 
W orld War 11. The revolt was discovered 
before it was launched and the Portuguese
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crushed it b loodily. The pro-Indonesian 
APODETI party falsely cla im  the revolt was fo r 
merger w ith Indonesia. Given that its leaders 
were Indonesian refugees, it was more like ly 
they aimed at using East T im or as a base 
against Indonesia to  support the South 
M olucca secessionists.
Nevertheless, the 1959 abortive revolt, 
com ing shortly  before the outbreak of 
liberation wars in all its A frican colonies, 
resulted in a new po licy  tow ards T im or by the 
Salazar regime, as part o f its new co lon ia l 
po licy in the S ixties. It was on ly  then tha t the 
Portuguese bu ilt any ^p rt of in frastructure  in 
the ir fo rgotten colony^ D ili’s few sealed roads, 
e lectric ity, the modern port com plex, concrete 
storm water canals, radio station and beacon, 
cold storage and warehouse fac ilities, a new 
hospital annexe and a few rudim entary 
“factories” (coffee production , soft drinks, 
biscuits, cigarettes, etc.) were established. 
Much also ill-conceived, to say the least. The 
a irport at Baucau can take jum bo jets, but 
actually handles only Fokker Friendships 
tw ice a week from  Darw in. They were 
superfic ia l developm ent projects, immersed in 
corrup tion  tha t did no th ing fo r the Timorese.
(M o re  im portantly, the Portuguese from  1969 
did move towards a com prehensive prim ary 
e d u c a t io n  s y s te m , w h ic h  has  bee n  
e n o rm o u s ly  im p o r ta n t  in  p o l i t ic a l  
developm ents over the past year. In O ctober 
1974, the Portuguese claim ed 52,000 prim ary 
school pupils. A lthough th is  wa% probably an 
inflated figure, the education has had an 
im portant impact. It was Portuguese in all 
aspects, aimed above all at incu lca ting  a “ love 
of Portugal" in the students. Under fasc ism s 
Timorese language and cu ltu re  was forb idden 
in the schools, 
f—
At the same time, the firs t high school and 
l^te r a technical school, were opened in Dili. 
Two re lig ious sem inaries o ffe r secondary 
education. Three hundred students attend the 
Dili lyceum, half non-T im orese. In Lisbon, 39 
Timorese are attending university courses. 38 
more began th is year. (3) Today there is the 
grand total of 13 T im orese graduates from  
Lisbon universities in East T im or, small in 
num ber but po litica lly  very im portant.
THE ELITE IN TIMOR
The elite - those w ith some education, jobs 
in adm in istra tion or trade, coffee plantation
owners, traders, etc. - are crucia l in a coun try  
like East T im or. The Tim orese e lite  is small, 
num bering at all levels perhaps 3,000. It has a 
number of com ponents: the trad itiona l luirais 
appointed and backed by fascism; the co lon ia l 
adm inistration, m ainly Portuguese at its top 
levels and part-T im orese, Goanese and 
C h in e se  a t its  lo w e r leve ls ; th e  sm a ll 
bourgeoisie, m ain ly Chinese traders and a 
h a n d fu l o f P o rtu g u e se  and T im o re s e  
p lantation owners; and skilled w orkers in 
co m m e rce , se rv ice  in d u s tr ie s  and the  
adm inistration.
( In a society like this, skilled w orkers such as 
postal technic ians, who in a coun try  like 
Australia w ould be at best in the m idd le  level of 
the w ork ing  class, fo rm  part of the elite, by the 
sheer fact that they enjoy a liv ing standards 
many tim es better than the unskilled workers 
or the villagers. Yet, at the same time, they 
remain in a subord inate  position w ith in  the 
adm in istra tion and commerce. As a result in 
many cases they are open to radical, 
nationa list views.
vThe o ther social classes are easily defined. 
First there is the 90 percent of the popula tion 
liv in g  th ro u g h  s u b s is te n c e  a g r ic u ltu re , 
s trugg ling  to  both feed themselves and pay the 
poll tax levied by the Portuguese, w ith the 
a lternative of forced labor. In the towns, 
particu la rly  Dili, a small unskilled w ork ing  
class, engaged in construction , transport and 
trade Extrem ely poorly-pa id , in most cases 
m igrants from  the villages, and com peting fo r 
work w ith the new ly-arrived villagers, the 
Tim orese w ork ing  class is in many ways the 
most oppressed. Drawn by the hope of m aking 
money and captivated by market fe tischism , 
having experienced town life, they are 
unw illing to return to the ir villages o f o rig in  
e xce p t on  h o lid a y  o c c a s io n s , th o u g h  
m ainta in ing close links.
[ jh e  m igrants from  the villages who fo rm th e  
lumpen pro le taria t of Dili are a new breed. 
Invariably young, w ith  a prim ary or even high 
school education, they come looking  fo r well 
paid jobs, w hich are sim ply not available. Of 
the dozen or so high school graduates in 
agricu ltu re  last year, fo r example, ten are 
w ithout jobs, scrounging a living by acting as 
guides, in terpreters, waiters o r o ther jobs 
where the ir English can provide some 
subsistence
It is from the elite, from  the skilled and 
unskilled w orkers and from the unemployed,
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educated youth, tha t the na tiona lis t and 
revo lu tionary movement in East T im or has 
drawn its cadres and insp ira tion. By being able 
to link up w ith the aspirations of the villagers, 
th is radical sector of the urban popu la tion  has 
sw iftly  transform ed East T im or in to w hat it is 
today.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
FRETILIN
Prior to A pril 25, 1974, a handfu l of young, 
educated members of the e lite  gathered 
surrep tiously in the gardens of the governor's 
residence, on Sundays, to discuss politics. 
Invariably young, they were educated in the 
early Sixties. Jose Ramos-Horta, son o f an 
anti-fasc is t Portuguese deportado and a 
T im o re se  m o th e r, had been se n t to  
M ozam bique in a form  of “ re-educative ex ile ” 
after a you th fu l nationa list escapade in the 
early seventies. In Mozam bique he w orked as a 
jou rna lis t and cameraman, covering the war. 
A lth o u g h  he never m et the  FR E LIM O  
guerrillas, his observations on ly strengthened 
the basic Tim orese nationalism  w hich had 
resulted in his exile in the firs t place.
In early 1974 he visited Darwin, where he 
spoke of his nationalist views to an Austra lian 
journa lis t, who unaware of the consequences, 
published them in the Northern Territory 
News. Horta, whom the fascist adm in istra tion 
had hoped had been “ re-educated” , was to  be 
deported to  Australia. H orta ’s luggage was 
a lready in Darwin when the coup occurred on 
April 25. He was due to take the plane to 
Darwin exile  on A pril 27. Am ong the other 
members of the clandestine discussion group 
was N icolau Lobato, a T im orese m inor 
adm in is tra tion  o ffic ia l, who was also an ardent 
^nationa list, and had absorbed some o f the 
I an ti-co lon ia lis t ideas from the w orldw ide 
movement.
Overnight, after April 25, the form er fascist 
adm inistrators, all of whom were members of 
the o ffic ia l Portuguese fascist party, became 
“ dem ocrats.” The ru ling elite met and planned 
to form  the Tim orese Dem ocratic Union (UDT) 
and register it as a po litica l association under 
the dem ocratisation announced from  Lisbon.
Horta and Lobato, concerned at the is land’s 
Establishm ent’s decision to form  such a party, 
considered firs t of all jo in ing  it, to work w ith in, 
but soon decided to form  the ir own party, the
Tim orese S ocia l-D em ocratic Association 
(ASDT), to pro ject independence as the goal. 
(The UDT accepted S p ino la ’s proposal of a 
federation w ith Portugal).
Horta, Lobato and others in the initial 
clandestine group were young (Horta was 24, 
Lobato 28) and fe ltth e  need fo ra n  o lderfigu re , 
well known in the island, to head the party. 
They therefore asked 38 year-o ld Xavier do 
Amaral, a fu ll Tim orese graduate from  the 
Jesuit sem inary in Macau, who had not 
entered the priesthood and held a m inor 
governm ent post in the port au thority , to 
become ASDT president. Xavier was very 
p o p u la r  a m o n g  th e  p e o p le  fo r  h is  
hum anitarian work and fo r his w illingness to 
represent them to the au thorities  in personal 
matters. The ASDT recru ited among the 
young elite in D ili, and in the villages where its 
leaders were part of the trad itiona l leadership. 
Yet, a lthough it had its m ajor goal as 
independence, its name and fo rm at was in a 
European mould. Its progress, because it was 
still very much a party of the radical elite, was 
slow.
The clandestine group emerged in to  public 
activ ity  in the firs t few days after A pril 25. A 
small section of D ili’s T im orese unskilled 
workers had begun a spontaneous strike 
which Horta and others soon spread among all 
the tow n ’s workers. Th is qu ick ly  won a 
doubling of the m iserable wage level. Horta 
and others form ed the C om m ittee fo r Defence 
o f L abou r, an e m b ry o n ic  tra d e  u n ion  
structure, which soon was absorbed into the 
ASDT.
W hile strong in Dili and a few villages, ASDT 
was in the firs t few m onths after A pril 25 way 
behind the UDT in its support. ASDT 
penetration into the m ounta in villages was 
d ifficu lt because of the legacy of Portuguese 
colonialism , the strong g rip  of the luirais 
(almost to ta lly  UDT) and the con tinu ing  fear, 
deliberate ly inculcated by the elite, that 
noth ing had really changed and repression 
w ould fo llow  any move away from  the UDT.
But the continu ing  radica lisation in Portugal 
had its  e ffe c ts  in a n u m b e r o f w ays. 
Portuguese papers arriv ing in the colony 
spread new ideas. Books by A frican liberation 
leaders such as A m ilcar Cabral radicalised 
many more. Soldiers com ing from  Portugal or 
o ther colonies carried these books and ideas 
w ith them. In July and August, five Timorese 
university students arrived back from  Lisbon,
m 4V i jhl 1 f &
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full o f such ideas and w ith close know ledge of 
the African liberation struggle. They qu ick ly  
convinced ASDT leaders that what was 
needed was not a European style movement, 
but a liberation front. On September 12, the 
\ ASDT general assembly transform ed itself 
in to FRETILIN (R evolutionary Front fo r 
Independent East T im or).
It was a m om entous decision. At the time, 
ASDT m em bership was 1,000. (1,000 ASDT 
cards had been issued, w ithou t payment 
collected). On September 20, FRETILIN held 
its firs t rally in Dili. A huge crowd of 20,000 
attended, launching the m ovem ent in to a 
period of rapid expansion w hich amazed its 
leaders and strained the lim ited cadre 
resources available.
By November, FRETILIN could boast 80,000 
signed up FRETILIN members. W herever the 
leaders went, they found an enorm ous 
response. In Maubisse, the seat of one of the 
most autocratic and pow erfu l luirais, the 
villagers soon flocked to them . A delegation of 
200 came to FRETILIN o ffices in Dili (Xavier’s 
T im orese-style house), in early November,
tore up the ir UDT cards and took FRETILIN 
ones. W ith in a m onth, Maubisse was a 
FRETILIN stronghold.
{_ Once the power of the UDT Establishm ent to 
physica lly punish villagers was shown to no 
longer exist, age-old d iscontent burst out 
against the Portuguese-appointed rulers. In 
villages th roughou t the island, schoolteachers 
and other m ino r o ffic ia ls  w ith some education, 
led the revolt and took whole villages in to 
FRETILIN. Only in the most isolated villages 
did not get swept in to the FRETILIN wave.
FRETILIN'S program  of developing an an ti­
illite racy cam paign in the local language, 
T e tu m , a p e o p le ’s h e a lth  s e rv ic e  and 
cooperatives showed the real concern of the 
movement w ith  the people ’s interests and was 
largely accountable fo r FRETILIN ’S v ic to ry in 
the villages. (4) This at the same tim e reflected 
itself in FRETILIN support among T im orese 
conscrip ts w ho absorbed what was happening 
generally in the country.
The c o n t in u in g  th re a t o f In d o n e s ia n  
invasion, spoken d irec tly  th rough  Radio 
Kupang, drove FRETILIN cadres in feverish
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activity, to  prepare the base fo r resistance to 
the Indonesians. Such an invasion was on the 
cards con tinua lly  from \O ctober onwards. The 
fears were particu la rly  intense in Decem ber 
and again in February. In January, the 
im m inence o f such an invasion was such that 
FRETILIN and UDT formed a coa lition  fo r 
independence and against invasion. UDT was 
then  c o n tro lle d  by its “ c o n s e rv a tiv e  
na tiona lis ts” such as secretary-general 
Dom ingues Oliveira. The continu ing  le ftw ard 
developm ent in Portugal and the g row th  of 
FRETILIN in T im or had forced UDT to take up 
the call o f independence while they also feared 
an Indonesian invasion.
But in the months that fo llowed FRETILIN 
made all the gains, w hile  UDT’s power 
continued to  shrink. In late February after the 
im m ediate invasion threat had passed, UDT 
began to tu rn  increasing ly against its a lliance 
w ith FRETILIN. UDT President Lopez da Cruz 
and V ice-President Costa M ouzinho, du ring  a 
v is it to Austra lia  last April, accepted advice 
from  the JIO  (Jo in t In te lligence O rganisation) 
and Brig. C allinan, a top DLP o ffic ia l and 
d irec to r of BP (Australia) to  break the coa lition  
w ith FRETILIN and move towards an “ an ti­
com m un is t” a lliance w ith APODETI. (5) They 
carried UDT w ith th is advice, defeating the 
O liveira faction , who still saw Indonesia as the 
main danger. In May, the coa lition  was broken. 
In June, da Cruz and M ouzinho visited 
D jakarta and received Indonesian support.
In late June FRETILIN refused to attend the 
Macau conference w ith Portugal and UDT and 
APODETI, because APODETI refused to 
recognise the princ ip le  of independence as 
the basis of the talks. This decision provided 
the Portuguese Governor, Lemos Pires, a 
close friend of Spinola, w ith the excuse to 
begin harassm ent of FRETILIN leaders and 
cadres, and to openly back UDT. The a n ti­
com m unist upsurge in Portugal in Ju ly- 
August, and the acute crisis there, allowed this 
to develop also in T im or. UDT ra llied its 
support among the elite and skilled w ork ing  
class, backed by the Church, to aggressively 
challenge the gains won by FRETILIN. In early 
August, da Cruz went to Djakarta and Hong 
Kong, where he finalised the details fo r 
support fo r the UDT coup attem pt on August 
11 .
FRETILIN leaders in the ir m ajority escaped 
death on August 11 only because they were in 
the m ounta in villages, leading FRETILIN 
Revolutionary Brigades form ed last June. The
R evolutionary Brigades are perhaps the most 
im portan t developm ent in the past year. The 
Brigades consist of the w ho le  leadership of 
FR E T IL IN , w ho  have g ive n  up th e ir  
com fortab le  jobs in D ili ar,d Baucau and led 
v ir tu a lly  the  w h o le  T im o re s e  s tu d e n t 
population in to the villages. There, they hoe 
the ir own fie lds and grow  the ir own crops, live 
in village huts, and use the rest of the ir tim e to 
carry out the an ti-illite racy  cam paign, based 
on the Friere method, w hich m eanscom bin ing 
po litica l education w ith the teaching of 
reading.
The Revolutionary Brigades also marked a 
vital step in FRETILIN ’S ideo log ica l evolution. 
The ideas, drawn from  A m ilca r Cabral, o f the 
radical “ pe tty-bourgeo is ie ” o r elite, breaking 
from  its privileges and orig ins and identify ing 
com plete ly w ith the poor villagers, found 
concrete expression in the decision to leave 
jobs and go to live in the villages. Moreover, 
th is decision was also reflected in a more basic 
po licy-decis ion to avoid the fo rm ation  of a 
privileged elite after independence. FRETILIN 
has decided that its leaders, from  the future 
Republic ’s President down w ill not live in big 
houses, draw big salaries or drive big cars. A 
m ajority of all the ir tim e w ill be spent each 
year, living and w orking in the villages.
FRETILIN is h igh ly aware o f the dangers of 
bureaucratisation after independence, and the 
form ation of a new, priv ileged elite. It is also 
aware that if independence is to have any 
meaning, it must mean a rapid im provem ent in 
the living standard of the m ajority  - the 
villagers. An independent East T im or would 
therefore concentrate capita l investm ent into 
the villages, b ring ing  new fe rtile  land under 
cu ltiva tion, im proving present cu ltivation 
methods, educating the people in nu trition  
and concentra ting on m ob ilis ing  the people to 
these goals. Industria lisa tion is seen as a 
future goal, on ly atta inable after a rural 
revolution has succeeded in adequately 
feeding the people and then provid ing a 
surplus fo r investment in industry. O f course, 
in such a rural revolution, the transport 
in frastructure, to open up internal trade is 
crucia l. But road and bridge construction  will 
of necessity be labour-intensive.
IS EAST TIMOR VIABLE?
A m ajor argum ent advanced by W hitlam  and 
the Indonesians against an independent East
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T im o r is th a t i t  w o u ld  n o t be v ia b le  
econom ica lly .(6) Certainly, a superfic ia l 
analysis shows East T im or to be one of the 
most backward colonies. It is, however, 
v irtua lly  com plete ly se lf-su ffic ien t as far as the 
vast m ajority of its people are concerned, 
though adm itted ly at a low liv ing standard. Its 
consum er im ports were fo r the consum ption 
of the Portuguese army, the local elite and the 
Chinese traders. Austra lian canned beer fo r 
example was a m ajor consum er im port: a 
m inor com m entary on A ustra lian cu ltu ra l 
im perialism  in D ili! Petroleum, construction  
m achinery and spare parts accounted fo i 
essential imports, a lthough petroleum  could 
qu ick ly  be produced dom estica lly in su ffic ien t 
quantities to avoid im ports .(7)
W ith the old elite having fled in large part 
into exile, the im port b ill on non-essentia ls can 
be s u b s ta n t ia lly  cu t, w h ile  ju d ic io u s  
encouragem ent of co ffee-grow ing and other 
exports crops can ensure su ffic ien t to  pay fo r 
imports. The possib ilities of large-scale oil 
discoveries of course w ould obviate these 
worries com pletely.
It is easy to see how avoidance of a 
privileged elite is not only a moral question, 
but one essential to  any econom ic progress in 
a country of such poverty as East T im or. It is a 
question of po litica l awareness: the m ora lity of 
a leader not d rink ing  a can of Tooths KB which 
costs the equivalent of a labourer's daily wage 
... and of re jecting the cu ltu ra l im perialism  
spread by tourists from  Australia.
Avoiding form ation of such a new elite is not 
an easy question, particu la rly  in the years to 
com e, if East T im o r su rv ive s  as an 
independent nation. In a socie ty such as T im or 
where scarcity prevails, pow erfu l forces push 
in th is d irection. And the pressure from 
outside - in particu la r Austra lia  and Indonesia
- can result in a weakening of resolve, as the 
tem ptations of power and privilege claim 
more and more recruits. The very fo rm ation  of 
a bureaucratic State apparatus itself also gives 
rise to such tendencies. In East T im or, the 
form ation of cooperatives in p roduction  and in 
im port-export trade can help avoid too great a 
bureaucracy, leaving much decis ion-m aking 
w ith the village and producer level. Moreover, 
c o n s c io u s n e s s  o f  th e  d a n g e r  o f 
bureaucratisation that cu rren tly  exists in 
FRETILIN can mean a strong cadre force 
keeping out of adm in istra tion  and m aintaining
d irect contact w ith  the villages, acting as a 
transm ission belt of the ir critic ism  and fo r an 
egalitarianism  w hich rejects elite privileges.
But it is the T im orese masses them selves - 
the villagers, the w ork ing  class, the student 
and unem ployed town youth - who can best 
help avoid bureaucratisation by insisting the ir 
leaders keep to the ir promises, and w atching 
carefu lly the ir actions. It is the expressed 
desire of the FRETILIN leaders that such a 
process of mass contro l operate that holds 
such hopes fo r the future.
Another danger facing East T im or, if it 
survives as an independent nation, is the 
possible g row th  of priv ileged elements at the 
village and urban level who seize part o f the 
increasing surp lus in rural p roduction  fo r 
themselves, becom ing rich peasants, o r small 
traders. The mass departure of Chinese 
traders, p lantation owners and o ther elite, 
means that most of com m erce and cap ita lis t 
p roduction  is vacated property  (bien vacant as 
it was termed in A lgeria when the French 
settlers staged a s im ila r exodus on the eve of 
in d e p e n d e n c e .) W ho sh a ll ow n these  
resources? The people as a whole, organised 
in cooperatives, or a new privileged T im orese 
trader and business class?
F R E T IL IN , aw are  o f the  d a n g e rs  o f 
econom ic and po litica l d isrup tion  if it forced 
these traders and businessmen to leave, 
before August 11 guaranteed the ir continued 
existence. Now, however, they have fled. 
Clearly, to set up a new T im orese elite  as 
traders w ould endanger the w hole stra tegy of 
opposition to an elite that FRETILIN has 
developed. FRETILIN had seen the gradual 
form ation of trad ing cooperatives as a means 
of com peting w ith the Chinese traders. Now 
there is little  doubt such self-m anaged 
cooperatives w ill be form ed, to fill the vacuum 
left by the departing elite. The anti-e lite  po licy 
of FRETILIN is perhaps best shown in the 
abolition of all ranks in the T im orese army, 
now under FRETILIN contro l.
INDONESIAN DANGER
Much of the above is of course based on the 
premise that Indonesia w ill not invade East 
T im or - a prem ise that at the time o f w riting  
seems quite un justified. It is of course a firs t 
p rio rity  fo r Austra lian workers, students and 
others to m obilise in opposition  to  an
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Indonesian invasion. But hope fu lly  the 
perspectives adopted by FRETILIN, outlined 
above, and the hope fo r the East T im orese they 
conta in, w ill help in that m obilisation.
C erta in ly, an Indonesian invasion w ould 
meet s tiff resistance from every East Timorese, 
it w ould be a m ini-V ietnam  on our borders. The 
costs of such a liberation war to the East 
T im orese w ould  be incalculable; tens of 
thousands w ould die. But the Indonesian 
generals w ould also have to measure the 
costs: any lengthy war in East T im o r w ould 
add to the underly ing ins tab ility  of the 
generals’ rule, inside Indonesia itself. It w ould 
add a vo la tile  element to the repressed 
po litica l life there.
CONCLUSION
The sudden rise of the national liberation 
m ovem ent - FRETILIN - in East T im or must be 
seen as a p ro d u c t o f th e  c o lla p s e  o f 
Portuguese fascism and co lon ia lism  (itse lf 
largely a result of the A frican liberation 
struggles) w hich in turn opened a Pandora’s 
box of revolt against 400 years of repression.
The  F R E T IL IN  cad res , by c r i t ic a l ly  
exam ining the lessons of the w orldw ide  
co lon ia l revo lu tion and apply ing them in the ir 
own specific  cond itions, found the way to the 
masses in such a way as to m obilise them in 
huge numbers. W hile its cadres were drawn 
from  the radical young elite, the w ork ing  class 
and the students, it also has developed 
peasant cadres w ho play an increasing role in 
the organisation.
W hat is qu ite  unique in FRETILIN is the 
degree to w hich consciousness of the danger 
o f a new privileged elite is determ in ing a new 
social and State structure which can, if 
fo llow ed consistently, if not avoid the 
fo rm ation  of a new elite, at least severely 
restric t the grow th both in size and power.
This consciousness can also extend in to  a 
tho rough-go ing  revolution at the v illage level, 
where the luirais and other “ notables” in the 
village en joy substantia l privileges over the 
rest o f the population. This involves not so 
much b ring ing  the average luirais down to  the 
level of the poorest villager, but rather of 
ensuring that w hile  the rich luirais have much 
o f th e ir  w e a lth  taken  fro m  th e m , the  
concentra tion  is on m obilis ing the poorest 
v illagers and m aking sure the village surp lus
goes to raise the ir liv ing standards. FRETILIN 
won 90 percent of the luirais elections 
conducted earlier th is year by the Portuguese 
th roughou t the co lony. A fte r the victorious 
struggle against the UDT counter-revo lu tion, 
these new luirais can in most cases be 
recruited to such a cam paign at the village 
level and not expropria te  fo r themselves the 
village surplus.
FRETILIN ideology has been variously 
described, as "populist” , “ tro tsky is t” , “ m aoist” 
o r what have you. All are equally inaccurate. 
FRETILIN is and rem ains essentia lly a 
nationalist movement, em erging firs t from  the 
radicalised elite, which has developed a 
specific  praxis, based on lessons from  the 
colonia l revolution w orldw ide  and from  their 
own concrete needs. It is certa in ly  pragm atic 
and eclectic in many regards, not in a negative 
sense but attuned to  the to ta l w orld  conditions 
in which the East T im orese revolution 
operates, draw ing from  all experiences, above 
all its own.
It is a revolution w ithou t great am bitions, 
w ithou t a desire to strike postures on the world 
stage. It is a revolution whose achievements, 
past and future, do and w ill m odestly speak for 
themselves. If it is w orthy of em ulation, then it 
is perhaps above all in its m odesty, in its anti­
e litism  and in its com plete devotion to the 
oppressed people who are m aking it.
- Sydney, Septem ber 8, 1975
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